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1 Introduction
Childcare is a key factor in the employment decisions of parents, especially of mothers.
The availability of different childcare options, their quality and their price are major de-
terminants of the work-family balance of households with (young) children. These issues
figure also highly on the policy agenda, which is illustrated by the Europe 2020 target of
increasing employment rates toward 2020 to 75% for the population aged between 20 and
64. Especially for women there is scope to increase the employment rate, and formal child-
care provisions figure prominently among the policy instruments to achieve this goal.1 The
Barcelona childcare targets formulated in 2002 by the European Council, and confirmed in
2005, should be viewed as part of this framework.2
In this paper we investigate the effect of different childcare options in terms of availability
and prices on employment decisions of mothers with young children in Flanders (Belgium).
The case of Flanders and/or Belgium in this domain remains largely under-studied, even
though the childcare context is interesting from an internationally comparative viewpoint.
To some extent, the Belgian welfare state remains oriented towards the breadwinner model
(e.g. in the form of substantial derived social security rights, tax support for sole earners).
However, in contrast to other continental welfare states, such as Germany, Belgium com-
bines this with a well-organized and more wide-spread system of institutional childcare,
and can thus be characterized by what Leitner (2005) called ‘optional familialism’. With
an enrolment rate in formal care of children younger than three of 48.4% (2008), Belgium
figures among the top nations in this respect in the OECD.3
Nevertheless, this does not mean that availability of childcare places is not an issue in
Belgium. There are indications that all three forms of non-parental childcare that we distin-
guish (i.e. informal care, non-subsidized and subsidized formal care types) are characterized
by excess demand, and hence that rationing is at work in the three types. The richness
of our dataset, the Flemish Families and Care Survey, allows us to incorporate this triple
rationing in our empirical analysis, which is a novelty in the literature. The distinction
between types allows for a robust identification of price and availability (supply) effects,
since the price and supply of the types varies strongly between municipalities, while the
service quality is relatively homogeneous, because public supervision extends to all types
of (formal) childcare.
Our paper builds on a structural labor supply model as proposed by Van Soest (1995),
using a discrete random utility maximization model. We extend this framework by explicitly
taking triple rationing in the Flemish childcare market into account. We do so in two ways.
First, in line with Wrohlich (2011), access restrictions to childcare are taken into account in
1According to EUROSTAT, the employment rate for men in the EU in 2010, the year when Europe 2020
was launched, was 75.1% while for women it was 62.1%.
2According to these targets, each country should provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children
between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 3 years of age.
3Only the Nordic States and the Netherlands have higher rates. (OECD, 2011).
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the budget constraint of each household. The expected price households pay for childcare
depends on household-specific offer probabilities of each type of care. Households who
enjoy a large probability of being offered a childcare spot of the informal type have a lower
expected childcare cost than a similar household with a low offer probability of informal care.
These offer probabilities are estimated by applying the partial observability framework, as
suggested by Poirier (1980). In contrast to Wrohlich (2011), we also take rationing in the
formal non-subsidized childcare sector into account, as we have clear evidence that this
sector also faces excess demand. Second, in the estimation of the labor supply model we
make a distinction between two different groups of households depending on their access to
childcare. Households that have a low probability of finding suitable childcare in general
are assumed to face a restricted labor supply choice set.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, because we have
clear evidence that the non-subsidized childcare sector in Flanders faces excess demand, we
extend the framework suggested by Wrohlich (2011) and explicitly take this rationing into
account in the model. Thus, we no longer rely on an automatic market clearing assump-
tion to identify rationing effects. Second, we propose an alternative way of taking total
rationing in the childcare market into account in the estimation of the labor supply model
by distinguishing between two groups of households, i.e. the non-restricted and restricted
households. Households who face a low probability of finding suitable childcare, face a
restricted labor supply choice set. Finally, our methodology can be used to analyse how
labor supply is affected by different policy changes. In line with estimates from countries
with stronger supply restrictions (Italy and Germany), we find that, for a country with a
relatively generous service supply, maternal labor supply is more sensitive to changes in
the availability of care than to changes in price. Not surprisingly, the estimates of the net
budgetary effect of expansion plans are strongly positive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the childcare context in Flanders.
Section 2 gives a brief overview of related studies in the literature. Section 4 explains in
detail how the different offer probabilities for the three types of childcare are estimated by
applying the partial observability model suggested by Poirier (1980). Section 5 presents our
methodological framework, and the data assumptions are explained in Section 6. The labor
supply estimation results and labor supply impact of some alternative policy scenarios are
presented in Section 7. The final section concludes.
2
2 Childcare in Flanders
This section discusses the childcare context in Belgium and more specifically in Flanders.
Section 2.1 gives an overview of which categories of care can be distinguished and how
frequently they are used. Section 2.2 discusses in further detail three important elements
of the childcare market in Flanders: the price, the quality, and the availability of childcare.
2.1 Types and usage of childcare
The childcare landscape in Belgium, and more specifically in Flanders, is highly fragmen-
ted, as can be seen in Table (1), but can roughly be divided in two categories: formal
and informal care. Child and Family (Kind en Gezin, K&G) supervises the organization
of formal childcare in Flanders and controls whether childcare providers meet the legal
requirements.4 Formal childcare mainly focuses on children between 3 (end of maternity
leave) and 30 months (start of publicly-financed nursery school).
A closer look at formal childcare providers suggests a distinction between subsidized and
non-subsidized care. The former receives cost-covering subsidies from Child and Family,
for which they need to be accredited. The formal non-subsidized childcare providers are
not eligible for these subsidies, and need only to register.5 In both cases, parents can
apply for a tax deduction, which is not the case if providers do not register. Therefore,
client pressure may explain why almost all formal care providers (both subsidized and non-
subsidized) are registered, and thus controlled by Child and Family. Secondly, in both
subsidized and non-subsidized care, a distinction can be made between child-minders and
day nurseries. Child-minders take care of a relatively small group (max. 8) of children
in their own house, whereas day nurseries are located in specific childcare centres. There
are also local services for neighbourhood-oriented care that are small childcare initiatives
aimed at providing diverse and easily accessible childcare, especially for more vulnerable
families.6 Child and Family partly subsidizes the latter initiatives working towards equal
opportunities (Ghysels and Vercammen (2012) & Kind en Gezin (2012)).
Beside formal childcare, informal childcare is also an important care channel. Mainly
grandparents, but also other family members, neighbours, or friends are possible providers
of care.
User surveys reported in Bettens et al (2002) and Hedebouw and Peetermans (2009b),
reveal a strong increase in the the frequent use of childcare (from 49% in 2001 to 63% in
4The same is undertaken by the Bureau of Birth and Childhood (Office de la Naissance et de l’Enfance,
ONE) in the French speaking community.)
5In order to be accredited, childcare facilities need to fulfil different legal requirements, which is not the
case if you are only registered.
6The first initiatives of local services for neighbourhood oriented care were taken in 1998 in Brussels,
Antwerp and Leuven. They received project-based support from Child and Family. Since 2009, this type
of childcare is legally and structurally integrated into the Flemish childcare landscape. More information
can be found at: http://www.lokalediensteneconomie.be/node/9.
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2009).7 The percentage of families that never used any type of childcare gradually decreased
from 41% in 2001 to 31% in 2009. Table (1) looks at the evolution of the main childcare
choices amongst families in Flanders. The use of informal care as the primary care-taking
channel decreased in favor of formal care (mainly the non-subsidized part of it). Within
the non-subsidized formal care sector, the most notable rise regards the (near) doubling of
child minders as the primary care-taking channel between 2001 and 2009.
Table 1: Most frequently used type of childcare, 3 months – 3 years, Flanders (%).
2001 2009
Formal subsidized care 45.6 46.9
- Child-minders 28.7 28.5
- Day nurseries 16.9 18.4
Formal non-subsidized care 17.8 23.9
- Child-minders 9.6 17.6
- Day nurseries 8.2 6.3
Informal care (grandparents) 29.9 22.4
Source: Bettens et al (2002) and Hedebouw and Peetermans (2009b)
2.2 Price, quality and availability of childcare
The price, quality and availability are three central factors of the market for childcare
services. This section discusses each of these items in detail for the Flemish childcare
context.
2.2.1 The price of childcare in Flanders
A first important aspect of childcare relates to the price paid by parents. This price differs
according to the type and amount of care.
Subsidized providers of formal childcare are obliged to apply a legally determined means-
tested tariff structure, dependent on household income. The payment rate differs in blocks,
rather than hourly proportions.8 In 2005, which is the year of the survey used in this paper,
78% of the children who were in formal subsidized childcare stayed a whole day (between 5
and 12 hours) and paid 100% of the daily price. This daily price lies between a minimum
price of 1.28 Euro and a maximum of 22.82 Euro with an average cost of 13.5 Euro. A
discount of 2.58 Euro is given for each dependent child in the family, after the first, and for
multiples.9 Childcare providers can also freely choose to apply a social tariff for households
7The category ’frequently’ means minimum 5 hours of childcare per week. For preschool children, these
5 hours need to take place in a continuous period. For children between 2,5 and 3 years going to a nursery
school, this continuity is not necessary.
8Four different categories can be distinguished. A Mini Day amounts to [0,3[ hours of care/day and is
charged 40% of the daily cost. A Half Day reflects [3,5[ hours/day and is charged 60% of the daily cost. A
Whole Day is equal to the range of [5,12[ hours/day and is charged at 100% of the daily price and a Maxi
Day reflects [12,24[ hours/day and costs 160% of the daily cost.
9For 2012, the minimum daily price is 1.5 Euro, the maximum price 26.68 Euro and the average daily
cost is 13.7 Euro. A discount of 3.02 Euro is given for each dependent child in the family.
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in a financially difficult situation, which is either 75, 50 or 25% of the normal means-tested
tariff.10
Non-subsidized providers of formal childcare are free to determine the price they charge.
Not much information is available about the price setting by these providers. The best
source available is a Child and Family report from 2009 (Hedebouw and Peetermans,
2009a). Based on this report, we can determine the average daily cost for a whole day
in non-subsidized care for children between 0 and 3 years old in Flanders. On average, a
non-subsidized child minder charges 17.16 Euro in 2009 and a non-subsidized day nursery
21.16 Euro. Reacting upon concern about the growing market share of the non-subsidized
sector (see Table (1)), and hence the expected growing cost for low income families, the
Flemish government introduced, as a test case, in 2009 the means-tested tariff system in
the non-subsidized sector. Registered but non-subsidized facilities may opt to join the
system wherein the same means-tested tariff structure as in the subsidized sector is ap-
plied. The Flemish government complements the parent’s means-tested contribution up to
a guaranteed daily price. 11 (Ghysels and Vercammen (2012)).
Additionally, parents who use accredited childcare (both formal subsidized and non-
subsidized) are eligible for a tax deduction. The taxable income of the fiscal unit is reduced
with out-of-pocket costs of childcare service, with a maximum of 11.20 Euro per day per
child in care. Since 2005, this is possible for dependent children until the age of 12. Families
who do not deduct childcare fees qualify for a lump sum raise of the income tax exemption,
equal to 520 Euro for every child younger than 3 in 2012 (Ghysels et al (2010)).
No information about prices (parental costs) in the informal sector is available. In the
empirical part of this paper, we assume that the cost paid by the parents for informal
childcare equals zero, which is the common assumption in the literature.
2.2.2 The quality of Flemish childcare facilities
A second important element is the quality of the care provided by the different child care
facilities. Both formal subsidized and non-subsidized childcare meet the legal requirements
of quality care, as determined by Child and Family. However, this doesn’t guarantee a
permanent level of high quality in itself. A quality check is only done at the opening of
a care center or when deemed necessary (e.g. after several complaints). The caretaker is
therefore itself responsible for the level of quality provided. Yet, this structural comment
does not obviate that satisfaction among parents is very high. A survey conducted by
Child and Family in 2009 (Hedebouw and Peetermans (2009a)) gives an idea about the
quality of childcare as perceived by parents in Flanders with a child between 0-3 years old.
96.2% judge the quality of the main care taking channel as very good (64.2%) or good
10No information about the frequency of use of this social tariff is available.
11Within the simulations presented in this paper, we use data from 2005. This means that we don’t use
the means-tested tariff structure for the non-subsidized childcare sector, because this was first implemented
in 2009.
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(32%). Informal care (mainly grandparents) is perceived as the most qualitative form of
care. Formal non-subsidized is considered the least qualitative one, although still more than
95% of the users judge this type of care as very good (55.9%) or good (39.4%). Questions
about the well being of the child in childcare gave similar results.
2.2.3 Triple rationing in the Flemish childcare market
A final important element regards the availability of childcare. There are indications that
all sorts of childcare services are in short supply in Flanders. Research commissioned by
Child and Family in 2007 indicated that 10% of parents were not able to secure a suitable
childcare service after a search period of six months (Market Analysis and Synthesis (2007)).
Obviously, we acknowledge that a cross-section result based on those who are currently in
the market does not provide full information on the dynamics of demand and supply. In
effect, supply may expand in the medium term and excess demand may be eliminated by
market forces. Haan and Wrohlich (2011) assume in their analysis of labor and childcare in
Germany, for example, that market forces automatically clear the market through supply
by non-subsidized providers. In their approach, rationing is limited to supply of subsidized
and informal care, which does not respond to classic market dynamics (e.g. rising prices).
Figure 1: Recent evolution in coverage rate of childcare for children aged up to three,
2002-2009
Source: Own calculation based on Kind and Gezin. (2002-2009). Jaarverslag Kinderopvang. Brussels.
Note: coverage rates are measured in full-time equivalents (i.e. the number of childcare places in full-time
equivalent divided by the total number of children in the age interval 0 to 3)
However, the recent past of Flemish childcare supply does not signal a quick response
of the formal childcare sector and, hence, questions the assumption of automatic market
clearing. On the positive side, the evolution reflected in Figure 1 does show that total
provision in the formal sector has grown. Yet, the growth rate hardly surpasses rises in the
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birth rate, and does not account for growing employment rates among mothers. Knowing
concurrently that informal (grandparental) care is on the decline (Ghysels and Van Vlas-
selaer (2007)), it is clear that over the last decade overall excess demand (formal+informal)
has not been eliminated.
Our second observation relates to the composition of the Flemish childcare services
market, which suggests a three-leveled hierarchy of rationing. Rationing that most parents
are likely to be confronted with, stems from the changing role of grandparents. As in
most European countries (Hank and Buber(2009)), the care contribution of grandparents is
decreasing in Flanders. Several explanations are given, such as more active ageing, through
which grandparents are still working or do not have the time to take care of children.
Meanwhile, many parents state that grandparents are their preferred care providers (Ghysels
and Debacker (2007)), which should not come as a surprise given their traditional role in
child-raising and the fact that they usually do not charge a price for their help.
Yet, childcare rationing goes beyond the informal part. Development of subsidized and
non-subsidized formal childcare led to locally uneven results. Municipal supply statistics
corresponding to our period of analysis (December 2004) show that the coverage rate12
of subsidized childcare averaged 24% and the coverage rate of non-subsidized childcare
averaged 11%. 13 For formal childcare overall, Flanders, 340 municipalities had an average
coverage rate of 34% (interquartile range 27 to 40%). While one small municipality boasted
a coverage rate of over 100%, it is more important to observe that the 95th percentile’s
coverage rate is only 54%. Confronted with municipal employment rates of mothers with
young children of on average 70%, there is little doubt that rationing in both the subsidized
and the non-subsidized childcare sectors may exist in at least some locations.14 Therefore,
we will assume that besides grandparental rationing, parents can also experience rationing
in subsidized and non-subsidized formal childcare.
12The coverage rate is defined as the amount of slots as a percentage of children below the age of 3 living
in the municipality.
13The interquartile range for the former equals 27% to 40% and for the latter 3% to 16%.
14Note that the part-time nature of demand for childcare does not warrant a simple equation of the
coverage rate with the employment rate of mothers. In effect, a full-time childcare slot may cover for more
than one child. As a rule of thumb, the Flemish childcare authority ‘Kind en Gezin’ assumes in its planning
exercises that a full-time slot can cover the demand of 1.2 children.
7
3 Literature review
There exists a large amount of literature describing the effect of children, and more specific-
ally the effect of childcare, on parental labor supply. Anderson and Levine (1999), Brewer
and Paull (2004) and Kalb (2009) provide overviews of the existing studies related to child-
care and labor supply. This latter study discusses in detail how the cost, availability and
quality of childcare affect parental labor supply decisions for different countries.
The literature about labor supply and childcare demand can be broadly classified into
two categories depending on the assumptions made regarding parental demand for childcare.
The first stream considers childcare as a way to make time time available for parents to
engage in market work. As such, childcare only forms part of the cost of working and
the demand for care is completely determined by the parental labor supply decision. This
is known in the literature as the “Cost of Working” approach, and only the employment
decision is endogenously modelled. Kimmel (1995), Averett et al (1997) andWrohlich (2004)
are examples of studies that can be found in this stream of literature. The second stream
assumes that households make their employment and childcare decisions simultaneously,
and thus it is known as the “Simultaneous” approach. Examples of studies that work in
the “Simultaneous” approach are Connely (1992) and Ribar (1995) for the United States
and Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) for Norway.15 The work presented in this paper can
be situated in the first stream of literature as our main purpose is to see how employment
decisions are affected by characteristics of the childcare market and not how childcare
choices are made.
The existing literature focuses mainly on three aspects of childcare: price, quality and
availability. Basic economic intuition suggests the price of childcare to be one of the most
important features of childcare in the parental labor supply decision. Hence, many studies,
regardless of working with a “Cost of Working” or “Simultaneous” approach, have put em-
phasis on these costs to explain labor market behaviour, such as the participation decision
of mothers. These effects are most often presented as elasticities that report the percent-
age change of labor supply and labor market participation which results from a percentage
change in childcare prices. Anderson and Levine (1999), Brewer and Paull (2004), Kalb
(2009) and Gong, Breunig and King (2010) provide summary tables of estimated elasti-
cities for different countries and subgroups. Their estimates vary across a wide range but
indicate that, on average, childcare prices affect labor supply negatively. For example, Blau
and Robins (1988) find for the United States an elasticity of maternal employment relative
to the price of childcare of -0.34; Ribar (1995) reports an elasticity of -0.09 for married
women in the United States; and Wrohlich (2004) finds an elasticity of -0.21 for German
mothers with full-time working husbands. Gong, Breunig and King (2010) state that this
variation partly reflects the fact that childcare and other welfare institutions vary across
countries and that differences in methodology and data sources may also play an important
15For a more detailed overview, see Brewer and Paull (2004) and Kalb (2009)
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role, making a direct comparison difficult. Anderson and Levine (1999) find that papers
taking a structural approach obtain elasticities on the lower end of these estimates, ranging
between 0 and -0.1.
In more recent literature, the focus has shifted from the cost of childcare to its avail-
ability and accessibility. This literature provides mixed evidence of the size and sign of
the effect of these availability constraints on labor supply. For Germany, Hank and Krey-
enfeld (2000) employ a multinomial logit model to estimate how the availability of public
and informal day-care arrangements affect female labor-force participation. The authors
find no significant effect of regional childcare provision on female labor-force participation.
Wrohlich (2011), however, does find significant labor supply responses for German moth-
ers of an increase in childcare availability. Wrohlich (2011) models availability restrictions
explicitly in the budget constraint, and assumes that rationing occurs only with respect to
subsidized childcare. The author assumes that childcare can always be bought at some (po-
tentially very high) price on the private market. Wrohlich (2011) shows that policy reforms
in Germany targeted at an increase in childcare slots had larger effects on maternal labor
supply than reductions of the cost in childcare. For Italy, Del Boca (2002), Del Boca and
Vuri (2007) and Brilli et al. (2011) find a positive impact of childcare availability on the
likelihood of mothers working. These studies restrict the choice set of households according
to a simulated probability of being rationed in the childcare sector. For Russia, Lokshin
(2004) models rationing by restricting the choice set of parents who report to be rationed in
the childcare market. Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) follow a similar method for Norway.
Both studies find positive labor supply responses to increased availability of the childcare
sector.
For Belgium in particular, there is hardly any literature about the effects of childcare
on labor supply decision of households. The only recent paper that estimates labor supply
elasticities with respect to childcare costs is Van Klaveren and Ghysels (2012). The authors
find, in contrast to many studies in the literature, positive labor supply elasticities with
respect to childcare costs. However, it is hard to compare their work to the work presented
in this paper because the authors use a collective household model which treats childcare
costs as a pure income effect, given the power balance (sharing rule) in the household.
Rising costs reduce the non-labor income of the household and, hence, motivate parents to
increase their working hours. Farfan-Portet, Lorant and Petrella (2011) analyse the impact
of both demand-side and supply-side subsidies on the use of formal childcare by low income
families in Belgium. They conclude that the choice of policy instruments is not neutral in
terms of access to formal childcare for families of different income groups. As such, the
authors call for a heterogenous treatment of rationing and availability restrictions, taking
household characteristics into account. We will return to this issue below.
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4 Triple rationing in the childcare sector
This section discusses in detail how rationing in the childcare sector is accounted for. Given
the triple face of rationing, we look in detail at the search process of parents when looking
for a suitable childcare place and estimate the probability of them being rationed in their
childcare choice.16
4.1 Rationing and the stepwise search for a childcare slot
Earlier, we characterized the Flemish childcare market and described its three main types
of care. In this section we develop an ordered estimation strategy based on the price
and quality attributes of the three types of care, which suggests a rationing hierarchy.
Grandparents hardly ever charge for their care, which makes their care by far the most cost-
attractive for parents. Even if opinions on the inherent quality of grandparents as carers
may differ between parents, we assume the price element to trump potential preference
issues and, hence, assume that parents who are looking for childcare will first turn to the
grandparents if available.17 Only if they cannot assure grandparental care to cover their
full care needs, parents will start searching within the formal sector.
Within the Flemish formal childcare sector, prices can be treated as the dominant
factor. The regulatory framework ensures that all types of providers attain high quality
levels, but prices vary strongly.18 In the subsidized sector, parents pay an income-related
fee with a maximum of e25 per day, while non-subsidized providers are free to determine
their prices. Even though a survey amongst non-subsidized providers of childcare services
in 2008 suggested that hardly any of them charge a daily price over the maximum of the
subsidized tariff 19, their prices are not income-related and, hence, using childcare in the
non-subsidized sector results in considerably higher costs than in the subsidized sector for
most parents.20 Therefore, we assume the non-subsidized sector to be the provider of last
resort, when parents cannot cover their care needs with grandparental help nor with care
from a subsidized care provider.
In short, we assume the search process of parents to follow the cost hierarchy of childcare
services in Flanders: first grandparents are considered as childcare providers, then an offer
of subsidized childcare is looked for and lastly parents attain whether they can secure a slot
in the more expensive non-subsidized sector.
16Note that we do not make a distinction between rationing for childminders and day nurseries. We only
focus on the distinction between informal, formal subsidized care and formal non-subsidized care.
17Ghysels and Debacker (2007) show that grandparental care is the most preferred type of childcare. See
also section 2.2
18Non-accredited providers are believed to be of marginal importance. (Kind en Gezin 2010)
19Unpublished data obtained from the Flemish governing authority ‘Kind en Gezin’.
20Earlier calculations by the authors indicate that even in the ninth income decile the income-related fee
amounts to less than 20 Euros a day, a 20% discount with regard to the usual price in the formal sector
(childcare centres).
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4.2 Rationing estimation through partial observability models
As will be discussed in the following section, our labor supply model incorporates estim-
ates of the offer probabilities of childcare that parents experience. The model necessitates
household-specific offer probabilities of childcare in general and for each type of care indi-
vidually. The general offer probability will be used to determine the set of labor market
choices that are open to specific parents, while the offer probabilities of each type will be
combined into a household-specific price of childcare.
Therefore, we estimate four offer probabilities: total supply (any type of childcare),
supply in the subsidized sector, supply in the non-subsidized sector and supply of informal
care (grandparental care).
To estimate these supply probabilities, we rely on a simultaneous estimate of demand
and supply of childcare using the partial observability probit framework suggested by Poirier
(1980) and adapted to a childcare setting by Viitanen and Chevalier (2003). We do not
apply the modified framework suggested by Wrohlich (2008), because, unlike Germany,
we see no large group of municipalities with full coverage, as already documented above.
The historically high supply of childcare services in the eastern part of Germany allowed
Wrohlich (2008) to restrict estimation to demand for only part of her sample, but no such
situation exists in Flanders.21
Following Poirier (1980), we treat the observed use of a childcare service of household i,
Ci, as the combined result of two unobserved, binary elements: having been offered a slot
(effective supply S∗i ) and having decided to use the offer (effective demand D∗i ).22 With all
variables in the following equation to take values {0, 1}, it is easily seen that use can only
be observed when both supply and demand are secured (i.e. equal to 1).
Ci = S
∗
i ·D∗i (1)
Poirier (1980) suggests modelling the realization of the two defining elements of observed
use as separate equations in a bivariate probit model. For our subsequent labor supply
estimates, we will only use point estimates of the supply part. In effect, the likelihood of
an offer of the childcare type concerned is exactly the (complement of the) family-specific
rationing probability that we need in the labor supply equation.
To obtain identified estimates, Poirier (1980) proved –unsurprisingly- that exclusive in-
struments are needed in every equation (supply and demand). For the estimation of the
overall use of childcare services (all types together), we identify demand through determ-
inants of maternal market work (maternal health, father’s labor market status, property
status of the family dwelling, maternal mother’s working status during the childhood of
the mother and maternal task division preferences). Supply is identified through various
21Neither do we rely on panel data, which might allow us to treat parents who had a slot in the year
before to be non-rationed as in Haan and Wrohlich (2011).
22For a detailed discussion of the methodology of partial observability models, we refer to the Appendix.
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indicators of grandparental availability and the coverage rate of formal childcare services
for the municipality of the household.
Regarding grandparental care, we identify supply through variables that have proven
to determine grandparental childcare efforts in earlier research (Uhlenberg and Hammill
1998; Hank and Buber 2009): the health of grandparents, their employment status and
the distance between their home and the home of the children requiring care. Demand by
the parents is identified through a preference indicator in the dataset, which relates to the
preferred type of childcare of the father (a similar indicator for the mother is not included
to avoid multicollinearity with other characteristics of the mother).
Regarding subsidized care, we assume the likelihood of an effective offer to be identified
by the municipal structure of childcare supply (coverage rate and proportion of subsidized
provision). Furthermore, indicators of the search skills of the parents (educational level
of the mother and poverty status) are included, as the latter proved to be linked to the
rationing experience in the 2007 research of MAS (Market Analysis and Synthesis 2007),
and various elements that determine the preference rules of subsidised childcare institutions
(family composition, family income), are taken into account. The latter allows us to clarify
that in our framework supply is to be understood as the offer as experienced (perceived)
by the household. To the extent that household characteristics explain variation in the
offer experienced by the household (because of search skills and/or preference rules), these
characteristics are determinants of supply. We identify demand through the inclusion of
preference indicators regarding formal childcare, and the likelihood of grandparental care
as estimated in the grandparent procedure. The latter follows from our hierarchical under-
standing of the search process (see Section 4.1). We expect parents with a high likelihood
of grandparental support to be less inclined to look for formal childcare.
Regarding non-subsidized care, we rely for identification of supply on the municipal
structure of formal childcare. For demand, we incorporate preference indicators regarding
formal childcare and include the previously estimated likelihoods of grandparental care and
subsidized care. Again, the latter reflects the assumed hierarchy in the childcare search
process, which sees the most expensive type of care (non-subsidized care) as less likely to
be demanded when either grandparental care or subsidized care are expected (i.e. have
high estimated use probabilities).
Finally, since the rationing indicators are to be used in subsequent labor supply es-
timates, we do not incorporate the employment status of the mother in itself as a control
variable. However, we do include the age and education level of the mother and incorporate
furthermore the age of the youngest child and the number of children in the household as
common determinants of supply and demand. While not being exclusive instruments, they
do influence the eventual use of childcare services.
Descriptive information on the variables included is given in Table (20) in the appendix.
The reader may note that the stated preferences regarding the type of childcare service
reflects a high proportion of formal-, rather than informal -care to be the first choice of
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mothers and fathers. Yet, we should not obviate that preference questions are likely to be
biased, since parents are invited to reflect on abstract preferences and not to take costs
and rationing into consideration. Therefore, we hereafter model the choice process as a
combination of supply and demand considerations.
Empirically, we estimate the likelihood of childcare utilization for the youngest child in
the household, excluding children younger than 6 months, because maternity and parental
leave regulations largely depress demand for childcare services for younger children.23 We
assume that parents with more than one child between the ages of 7 and 35 months use
similar arrangements for all these children. Above the age of 35 months, the use of child-
care services is drastically reduced, because children quasi-universally enter pre-primary
education before the age of three.
4.3 Estimates
Table 2 shows the results of the four estimation procedures described above.24 It reflects
the predicted offer probabilities of informal or grandparental care, formal subsidized, formal
non-subsidized care (pinfi , p
fs
i , p
fns
i ) and the predicted probability of an offer of any type
of childcare service ptoti , which is the combined probability of parents finding grandparents
willing to take care of their child and/or finding a formal childcare slot of any type. The table
shows that the latter probability, ptoti , is not a simple sum of the underlying probabilities
(pinfi , p
fs
i , p
fns
i ). This follows from the importance of combination probabilities as shown
in the following equation:
ptoti = p
inf
i + p
fs
i + p
fns
i −
p(Sinfi ∪ Sfsi )− p(Sfsi ∪ Sfnsi )− p(Sinfi ∪ Sfnsi ) +
p(Sinfi ∪ Sfsi ∪ Sfnsi ), (2)
with S denoting supply and p referring to a (supply) probability.
In the empirical procedure, we have avoided estimating every combination probability
separately, by estimating the total offer probability directly. Table 2 shows that parents
face an average supply probability of .82, with 7% (1-93%) of the parents in our sample
living in a situation of excess demand, i.e. being totally rationed in childcare.
The variation in the predicted offer probabilities of the separate types of care, on the
other hand, underpins the distinction we will make when calculating the expected cost of
childcare. As will be discussed further in Section 5.2.2, due to the high variation in offer
probabilities for the three different sectors, we expect the price of childcare to vary strongly
between households.
23Haan and Wrohlich (2011) avoid estimations for all children younger than 12 months, but our dataset
shows that in Flanders childcare service use resumes earlier than in Germany.
24The estimated coefficients are included in the appendix.
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Table 2: Predicted offer probabilities of three types of childcare services
Type of care Mean pred. probability p25 p75 % above .50
(1) Grandparental care pinfi .50 .30 .72 50%
(2) Subsidized formal care pfsi .86 .81 .99 90%
(3) Non-subsidized formal care pfnsi .63 .33 .95 64%
(4) Any type of childcare service ptoti .82 .73 .95 93%
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005), N = 512
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5 Theoretical framework
The first part of this section provides a brief overview of the existing methodology of labor
supply modelling and the second discusses the model applied in this paper.
5.1 Modelling labor supply
Up to the nineties, labor supply was modelled in a continuous way, see Hausman and Ruud
(1984) and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), where the household chooses from a continuous
set of hours. The household selects the best combination of labor supply and consumption
so as to maximize its utility function, given a time and budget constraint. However, this
way of modelling labor supply was increasingly criticized. First, assuming a continuous set
of hours implies that one has to derive the full budget constraint of each household, i.e.
the net disposable income, at each hour-point. This often leads to practical problems and
time-consuming work. Second, the maximization problem is very complex because the tax
function is often non-linear, which leads to non-convex budget sets. Third, the model does
not allow for individual utility maximisation, but rather assumes homogeneous household
decision making. Finally, and possibly the most important drawback of this methodology,
the assumption that individuals may choose their optimal point anywhere along the budget
constraint is not realistic. As pointed out by Aaberge and Colombino (1999), the structure
of labor costs makes it less attractive to firms to offer contracts that allow for flexible work
schedules. Consequently, the choice set available for the individual may be severely reduced.
In order to overcome several of these problems, researchers have made use of a dis-
crete random utility maximization model (RUM) initiated by Daniel McFadden (1974).25
Two distinct features can be observed when comparing this method with the continuous
approach. In this methodology the household’s hour-choices can be approximated by a
discretized set instead of a continuous one. Secondly, the optimal labor supply choice is
modelled in terms of a comparison of the different utility levels at the discrete choices.
Introducing a random utility term that is assumed to be distributed according to an ex-
treme value distribution leads to an easy expression for the probability that any particular
discrete labor supply point is chosen. These models are structural in the sense that there is
no reduced form labor supply function which depends on wages and non-labor income but
that the structural parameters for the preference for consumption and leisure are identified
out of an a priori assumed functional form of the utility function. Van Soest (1995) can be
seen as one of the first papers that applied this random utility framework to the estimation
of labor supply. Our paper estimates such a discrete labor supply model for Flanders, with
an explicit focus on childcare.
25McFadden (1974) applied these random utility models to several transport and occupational choices.
He considered these choices to be discrete.
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5.2 Methodological framework
This subsection explains in detail which labor supply model is estimated, and how we extend
the model suggested by Van Soest (1995) by taking childcare explicitly into account. We
develop our approach only for couple households with a father engaged in full-time work.
In other words, the choice variable of the household is the labor supply of the mother. labor
income of the father is assumed to be given. We will discuss the exact empirical relevance
of this selection of households below.
5.2.1 General outline of the model
Van Soest (1995) assumes that each household is confronted with a limited amount of
labor supply alternatives j = {0, 1, ..., J}. The utility of household i when supplying j =
{0, 1, ..., J) hours of work per week is equal to:
Vi,j = Ui((T − hi,j), Ci,j |Xi) + i,j , (3)
in which T stands for the total available time per week, hi,j represents total labor supply
of mother i at alternative j, Xi are household characteristics and Ci,j stands for total
disposable household income when the mother works j hours per week.
In line with Van Soest (1995), we assume that utility Vi,j can be divided in two parts.
The first element of equation 3 reflects the structural or deterministic component of util-
ity which is assumed to be known to both researcher and household. This deterministic
part depends on the amount of weekly non-working time, (T − hi,j) and total disposable
household income Ci,j at the chosen discrete point j, given household characteristics Xi.
The second part is random and is unknown to the researcher but assumed to be known
to each household individually. This term arises from factors such as measurement errors
concerning the variables in Xi, optimization errors of the individual, or the existence of
unobserved preference characteristics.
Assuming that the random term is identically and independently distributed across
households and alternatives according to an extreme value distribution, McFadden (1974)
shows that the probability that household i chooses an alternative k from their choice set
j = {0, 1, ..., J} is given by
pi,k = Pr(Vi,k ≥ Vi,j , ∀j = 0, ...J) (4)
=
expUi((T − hi,k), Ci,k|Xi)∑J
j=0 expUi((T − hi,j), Ci,j |Xi)
Van Soest (1995) assumes that each discrete labor supply point from the choice set
j = {0, 1, ..., J} is equally available and accessible to each household.26 Above, we argued
26Note, however, that Van Soest (1995) includes alternative specific constants for part-time work in the
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that some households face availability restrictions in the childcare market and do not find
suitable childcare if needed. Therefore, we extend the standard Van Soest (1995) model and
assume that mothers who are rationed in their childcare choice have a restricted labor supply
choice set j = {0} that includes only non-participation. Mothers who have a probability
of being offered a childcare spot in general ptoti that is lower than 50%, are assumed to
be restricted in their choice set and do not have the opportunity to accept market work.
According to Table (2), 7% of all households in our sample face a restricted choice set.
The parameters of the utility function Ui are estimated by maximum likelihood as the
individual likelihood contributions, and can be derived from expression (4). Households that
face a restricted choice set are not taken into account in the estimation of the household
preferences as their individual log likelihood contribution is zero.
5.2.2 Specification of the model
According to Equation (3), the deterministic part of household utility depends on the
amount of non-working time of the mother (T − hi,j) and net disposable household income
Ci,j when working j hours. In line with Keane and Moffit (1998) and Blundell et al. (1999),
we assume the following quadratic specification for the deterministic part of utility:
Ui((T − hi,j), Ci,j |Xi) = βc [Ci,j ] + βcc [Ci,j ]2 +
βh(Xi) [T − hi,j ] + βhh [T − hi,j ]2 +
βhc [T − hi,j ] · [Ci,j ] (5)
where we allowed for interaction effects between non-working time and income. We allow
for heterogeneity in the estimated coefficient for non-working time (T − h):
βh(Xi) = βh,0 + β
′
hX
h
i (6)
where Xhi is a vector representing the observed heterogeneity that contains variables such
as education and age of the mother, and number and age of children.
The net disposable household income Ci,j of household i when supplying j amount of
hours can be formally written as:
Ci,j = t (hi,j · wi, Ii)− E [Pi,j ] , (7)
where the function t denotes the tax-transfer system, wi stands for the hourly gross wage,
Ii represents all non-labor income27 and E[Pi,j ] equals the expected childcare costs for
household i when working j hours.
estimation of the model in order to account for the lack of availability of part-time jobs.
27The model is estimated for married mothers with a full-time working husband. The income of this
spouse is an element of mothers’ non-labor income.
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When mothers are considering labor supply, we assume they take into account two
decision elements regarding childcare: the probability of finding a slot of any type, which
determines the possibility to accept a job offer, and the price they are expected to pay for
the service, which influences the net gain of a potential job offer. The former is included in
our model in the restricted choice set of some households and the latter is reflected in the
budget constraint of each household. The expected price of childcare of household i with
the mother working j hours per week is the weighted average of the unit price of the three
different types of childcare for j hours of care per week :28
E[Pi,j ] = z
inf
i · P infi,j + zfsi · P fsi,j + zfnsi · P fnsi,j . (8)
The household-specific weights for the informal childcare market and the formal subsidized
and formal non-subsidized childcare markets are represented respectively by zinfi , z
fs
i and
zfnsi . The household-specific price for the three different childcare types when working j
hours is given by P infi,j , P
fs
i,j and P
fns
i,j . Given the zero price of grandparental care, the former
equation reduces to:
E[Pi,j ] = z
fs
i · P fsi,j + zfnsi · P fnsi,j . (9)
In this equation, weights depend on the likelihood of an offer of a particular type of care
relative to the other likelihoods, see Section 4.3. The reference value is not straightforward,
however. A simple approximation of parental behaviour assumes that parents sum all
likelihoods and assign weights proportionally, as in:
zti =
pti
pinfi + p
fs
i + p
fns
i
, for t = {fs, fns} (10)
Yet this assumes that parents do not discriminate between price options, while ration-
ality assumes that decision makers choose, ceteris paribus, the least costly solution. Hence,
in their demand for childcare parents can be assumed to choose grandparental care over
formal childcare options, because the former is free and the latter are not, and to choose
for subsidized formal childcare over non-subsidized childcare, because the former is gener-
ally cheaper than the latter. The denominator of the following weighting equation takes
this stepwise demand pattern into account, assuming that the probability of formal care is
only counted to the extent informal care is not expected to be available, (1 − pinf ), and
the probability of non-subsidized care is weighted to an even lesser degree because it is
the option of last resort, and depends on the probabilities of the two preceding options,
28As discussed before, we assume that the demand for childcare equals the amount of labor supply.
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(1− pinf )(1− pfs). Therefore, the weights used in Equation 9 are given by:29
zfsi =
(1− pinfi ) · pfsi
[pfsi + (1− pfsi ) · pfnsi ]
(11)
zfnsi =
(1− pinfi ) · (1− pfsi ) · pfnsi
[pfsi + (1− pfsi ) · pfnsi ]
(12)
29Note that Equations 11 and 12 contain a normalizing factor (1− pinf ), which ensures that the sum of
the weights for the formal care options to be (1 − pinf ) and hence to complement the weight of informal
care which carries a zero price.
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6 Data assumptions and childcare rationing
Section 6.1 provides an overview of the data which is used in this study. Section 6.2 briefly
shows which discrete labor supply points are available for each household. Finally, we
discuss in detail how the budget constraints look and how they are affected by childcare
costs.
6.1 Data
This paper uses data from the 2004-2005 Flemish Families and Care Survey (FFCS) that
contains a representative sample of 1275 Flemish families with a youngest child aged up to
three years.30 The survey contains relevant information such as childcare utilization , the
cost of childcare, household income, working hours and household characteristics.31
The model presented in this paper is estimated on a subsample of couples.32 Only
couples in which both partners are available for the labor market are retained in our sample.
Moreover, we only consider the labor supply decision of the mother, and focus on couples
in which the father works full-time.33 We try to keep the model relatively simple by
focusing on this specific subgroup which represents the most common situation among
families with young children.34 Hence, we can investigate the labor supply decisions of
mothers separately.
Both partners need to be aged between 18 and 65 years old and not in education,
(pre)retired, disabled or ill. Self-employed individuals are excluded from the sample for two
reasons: no reliable information about hours worked is available for them, and the labor
supply decisions of self-employed people are possibly very different from those of salaried
workers. Furthermore, households with children already available for the labor market
but still living with their parents are excluded from the sample. The reason for this is
that it is possible that their labor supply decisions are different from households without
working children, because it is not clear whether the former households see their labor
supply decision as a collective or an individual process. We retain a dataset containing
512 households. Descriptive statistics about this sub-sample can be found in Table (21) in
appendix.
30We do not use data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) for our analysis, which
is the standard database used in Flemosi-based simulations. The reason for this is twofold: first, we are
unable to distinguish in SILC between formal subsidized and formal non-subsidized childcare. The second,
and most important reason is that the SILC data does not contain enough Flemish families with a youngest
child between 0 and 3 years old.
31For more information about the FFCS, see Debacker et al. (2006).
32Not enough cases of single mothers (58 cases) or single fathers (10 cases) are available in our sub-sample
to estimate a separate discrete labor supply model.
33Full-time work is equal to the interval [35,60] hours per week.
34In 76% of households with a child below 3 years old, the father was working full-time in 2005 (Ghysels
and Debacker, 2007:26).
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Figure 2: Hours distribution female
6.2 Discrete labor supply points
In the Flemish Family and Care Survey (FFCS), information on the number of weekly hours
worked in the month before the interview was given, and is presented in Figure (2). We
assume that women face a choice set of four discrete points; not working (0 hours), working
part-time (20 hours), 80% work (32 hours) and working full-time (40 hours).35
As already discussed in Section 3, we use a cost of working approach, which considers
childcare only as a way to make time available for mothers to engage in market work. This
means that the amount of care is completely determined by the maternal labor supply.
Households in which the mother is not working do not require childcare. If the mother
works part-time, households demand 2 full days and 1 half day of care. A mother who
works 4 days in a week is in need of 4 full days of childcare and a full-time working mother
needs 5 days of childcare.36 We make the assumption that it is not possible for parents to
work and take care of their children at the same time. Also, the assumption is made that
parents are unable to organize their working hours in a flexible way, in order to be able to
maximize the amount of time they can take care of their children themselves.
6.3 Budget constraints
In order to be able to estimate the model presented in Section 5, household disposable
net income is required for each discrete point (see Equation 7 ). We apply the tax benefit
35Not working equals the interval [0,10] hours/week, part-time is equal to [11,25] hours/week, 4/5 to
[26,35] hours/week and full-time reflects the interval [35,50] hours/week.
36A half day of childcare is charged 60% of a full day. Hence, 2 full days and 1 half day is charged 2,6
full days.
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microsimulation model Euromod for the derivation of these budget constraints.37
Gross earnings from employment are calculated by multiplying gross hourly wages by
the respective working hour in each hours category. We hereby make the assumption that
the hourly wage rate is independent of the amount of hours worked, which implies that
gross earnings increase linearly with working time. Due to this assumption, hourly wages,
are obtained by dividing observed gross income by the actual observed number of hours
worked.
There are also households where gross earnings are not observed, for example house-
holds with unemployed or inactive mothers. Most studies in the literature apply a Heckman
correction model for the estimation of hourly wages in order to avoid biased estimations
due to sample selection. It could be that the average wage for someone in the labor market
is substantially different than for someone who is out of work. Participants in the labor
market may have observable and/or unobservable characteristics that determine wages and
that are different from the ones of the inactive or unemployed. We estimated such a Heck-
man correction model for women, but found that the selection effect was not significant.38
Consequently, there is no need to account for a possible selection effect and a simple wage
regression can be used. The estimation results of this wage regression can be found in Table
(22) in appendix. As expected, higher experience and higher schooling lead to higher gross
hourly wages.39
Gross household income is equal to the sum of the labor earnings of all household
members. The income tax and employees’ social security contributions are deducted from
gross income, and social transfers are added to obtain the net disposable household income.
Social transfers include child benefits, education benefits for students and housing benefits.
No social assistance benefits or unemployment benefits are granted to households.40
According to Equation 7, expected childcare costs are also taken into account in the
calculation of the budget constraint. Given the estimated probabilities of receiving an offer
of childcare for the three sectors (see Table (2)) and the stepwise search for care by parents,
we derive the expected childcare cost for each household at each discrete labor supply point
according to Equation 9. The higher the probability of being offered a place in informal care,
the lower the expected childcare cost. The lower the probability of an informal childcare
place, the higher the expected childcare cost, as households must rely on more expensive
childcare such as formal subsidized or non-subsidized care.41 These expected costs are
37More information about Euromod can be found at https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod.
38Results are available from the authors upon request.
39Wages are imputed for 76 households (14,8% of our sample).
40We only look at households in which the male works full-time, so these families are not eligible for
means-tested social assistance.
41An example can make this more clear. Take a low income family whereby the female, if working, has
a gross hourly wage of 8 Euro. The male works 40 hours and has a gross hourly wage of 12 Euro. They
have one child younger than 3 years old. In a first simulation, we assume that the expected probability
of receiving an offer for this family equals in the informal childcare sector 80%, and in both the formal
subsidized and non-subsidized sector 30%. The expected cost of childcare for this family is calculated using
Euromod and equals 25 Euro / month, 41 Euro / month or 54 Euro / month, when the female works
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included in Euromod and then subtracted from households’ net disposable income. For the
calculation of the cost of formal subsidized childcare, we simulate the 2005 tariff structure
in detail. We use a Child and Family survey of 2009 for the calculation of the cost of formal
non-subsidized childcare (Hedebouw and Peetermans, 2009b). As mentioned before, we can
only determine the average daily cost of care by a child-minder (17.16 Euro) or by a day
nursery (21.16 Euro), respectively 68% and 84% of the maximum daily cost in the subsidized
sector in 2009. We used these percentages to calculate an average daily cost of childcare by
a non-subsidized child minder and a non-subsidized day nursery in 2005. This resulted in
a daily cost of 15.23 Euro for a child minder and 18.8 Euro for a day nursery, respectively
68% and 84% of the maximum daily cost in the subsidized sector in 2005. In line with the
formal subsidized sector, we charge only 60% of the daily price for half a day of childcare
in the formal non-subsidized sector. For both the subsidized and non-subsidized sector, the
tax deduction for childcare is simulated within Euromod. Childcare in the informal care
sector is assumed to be free of charge.
Table 3 presents the cost of childcare for an average household in our sample for each of
the three types of childcare. By assumption, the price households have to pay for informal
care in each of the four discrete labor supply points is zero. If, on the other hand, this
average household uses formal subsidized care it would pay 126 Euro/month when the
mother is working 20 hours per week. This amount increases to 295 Euro/month when
working full-time. A similar household that uses formal non-subsidized childcare pays a
considerably higher fee for each of the three strictly positive labor supply points.
Table 3: Illustration of average cost of childcare (Euro/month)
Informal childcare Formal sub. care Formal non-sub. care
0 hours 0 0 0
20 hours 0 126 170
32 hours 0 221 262
40 hours 0 295 327
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
Table 4 provides summary statistics of the weighting factors in the childcare cost equa-
tion 8. On average, the cost of formal subsidized care is for 45.90% accounted for and
the average weight for formal non-subsidized childcare equals only 3.68%. The weight for
informal care, which is provided for free, is on average 50.41%. We see, however, a large
variation in these weights by looking at the minimum and maximum. Consequently, the
expected price of childcare varies strongly between different types of households.
respectively 20, 32 & 40 hours per week. In a second simulation, we assume an expected probability of
30% in both the informal and the formal subsidized childcare sectors, and of 80% in the more expensive
formal subsidized sector. The expected cost of childcare for this family equals now 100, 160 and 205 Euro
per month, when the female works respectively 20, 32 & 40 hours per week.
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Table 4: Childcare cost weighting factor
Mean Std. dev Min Max
Informal zinfi 50.41 26.28 1.24 99.17
Formal sub zfsi 45.90 27.89 0.10 98.75
Formal non-sub zfnsi 3.68 8.14 0.00 63.82
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
Table 5 provides summary statistics of the budget constraints. The average household
income if the mother is not participating in the labor market equals 2 579 Euro/month.
Remember that we focus solely on households in which the father is working full-time. This
income is included in the budget constraint, and explains why net disposable income when
working 0 hours is considerable. The more the mother works, the higher the average net
disposable household income.
Table 5: Net disposable household income (Euro/month)
Mean Std. dev Min Max
0 hours 2579 700 1004 6482
20 hours 3275 753 1671 7120
32 hours 3649 804 1951 7491
40 hours 3879 843 2115 7788
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
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7 Labor supply estimation results
This section discusses the results from the labor supply estimation by looking at the para-
meter estimates of the quadratic utility specification. In order to fully capture the hetero-
geneity in preference structure, we present an overview of the marginal rate of substitution
for different subgroups, look at the fit of the model, and calculate labor supply elasticities.
Section 7.2 looks at the effect of childcare costs on maternal labor supply in Flanders, and
discusses how rationing affects maternal labor supply decisions.
7.1 Labor supply estimates
Table (6) presents the estimated parameters of the quadratic utility function in Equation
5. Looking at the estimated coefficients for non-working time, we clearly see that there
exists heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The parameter for age of the mother has a
significant negative value and the quadratic term is significantly positive. Older mothers
appear to attribute less value to non-working time than younger women. We find that the
taste for non-working time increases with the presence of children, the size of the coefficient
depending on the age of the children. The estimated coefficients with respect to schooling
reveal that mothers without higher education have a larger preference for leisure than highly
educated mothers. Consumption positively affects a mother’s utility and the quadratic term
for consumption is negative, which is in line with the theoretical predictions. Note that no
heterogeneity is included for preference for consumption.
Table 6: Estimated parameters of quadratic utility function
Coeff. Std. error 95% conf. int.
Consumption (βc) 8.504** 3.120 2.389 14.618
Consumption sq. (βcc) -0.621** 0.268 -1.150 -0.096
Non-work time (βf (Xi))
Age -0.027** 0.011 -0.049 -0.005
Age squared 0.0004** 0.0001 0.000 0.001
Children 0-3 0.021** 0.009 0.003 0.039
Children 4-6 0.033** 0.008 0.017 0.047
Children 7-9 0.027** 0.0101 0.006 0.047
Higher education -0.026** 0.001 -0.045 -0.007
Constant 0.595** 0.216 0.171 1.0718
Non-work time sq. (βff .) -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000
Non-work time * Cons. (βfc) -0.028* 0.019 -0.065 0.007
*Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
A comparison of the actually observed and predicted frequencies of mothers in each
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discrete labor supply point shows that the estimated model fits the data very well, see
Table (7).
Table 7: Observed and predicted labor supply densities
Observed density Estimated density
0 hours 19.36 18.50
20 hours 20.70 19.93
32 hours 26.56 27.76
40 hours 34.38 33.80
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
Table (8) presents the preference heterogeneity by means of the variation in the mar-
ginal rates of substitution for different subgroups. For each observation in our sample, we
calculate the slope of the indifference curve at the same bundle of 20 hours work and a
net disposable monthly income of 3200 Euro, which is the average income observed for 20
hours of work per week. Different marginal rates of substitution reveal different preferences
for the considered subgroups. An average mother in the whole sub-sample requests a com-
pensation of 17.3 Euro for one additional hour of work. We see that a mother without a
university degree has a higher preference for leisure than a similar mother with a university
degree. The former is willing to give up 23.4 Euro for one additional hour of non-working
time, whereas the latter is only willing to sacrifice 14.1 Euro. The amount of preschool
children also clearly affects mother’s preferences. A mother with only one child between 0
and 3 years old has a marginal rate of substitution of 17.0 Euro. A similar mother with
two preschool children has a marginal rate of substitution of 18.0, and this increases to 33.0
Euro for a mother with three preschool children. Having more preschool children leads to
higher preferences for non-working time.
Table 8: Marginal rates of substitution
Subgroup Marginal rate of substitution Standard error
Whole sample 17.3 10.5
No university degree 23.4 10.2
University degree 14.1 9.1
One child 0-3 17.0 10.7
Two children 0-3 18.0 9.5
Three children 0-3 33.0 9.9
Note: Marginal rates of substitution were calculated in the bundle (C,h)=(3200,20)
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
An alternative way of interpreting the estimated coefficients is by looking at the size of
labor supply responses with respect to changes in budgetary constraints. Table (9) provides
the elasticities with respect to a increases in gross hourly wages and childcare prices. The
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structural basis of a discrete labor supply model implies that there is no explicit labor
supply function from where one can derive the wage elasticity. Therefore, numerical meth-
ods are used to analyse the sensitivity of labor supply with respect to wage changes. The
individual’s gross wage or childcare cost is increased by 10%, keeping all the other character-
istics constant. We simulate the new budget constraint of each household using Euromod,
and the new expected labor supply can be calculated, given the estimated coefficients. The
hours elasticity expresses the percentage change in total hours supplied with respect to a
given percentage increase in gross hourly wage or childcare cost. The participation elasticity
is defined as the expected percentage change in labor market participation after a given
percentage change in gross wages or childcare cost.
We find a total hours elasticity for wages of 0.275 and a participation elasticity of 0.192.
These results are in line with expectations and the literature, see, for example, Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) and Keane and Rogerson (2012). For Belgium more specifically, Orsini
(2006) estimates total hours elasticity in the range [0.16, 0.30] and participation elasticity
between [0.10, 0.19].42
The participation elasticity with respect to childcare costs is equal to -0.034 and total
hours elasticity to -0.056. In line with the literature, these labor supply elasticities are
negative and rather small. Increasing the cost of childcare by 10 percent leads to a small
decrease in labor force participation of 3.4% for the subgroup of Flemish mothers. Flemish
maternal labor supply appears to be rather insensitive to price changes.43 Wrohlich (2011)
asserts that policy reforms related to the rationing in the childcare market are more effective
than reforms that focus on the cost of care. Section 7.2 investigates if this statement also
holds for Flanders.
Table 9: labor supply elasticities
Participation elast. Total hours elast.
Wage increase 0.192 0.275
Childcare cost increase -0.034 -0.056
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
7.2 Labor supply impact of alternative policy measures
The model can be used to analyse how policy proposals potentially affect Flemish maternal
labor supply. We present the results of four different policy proposals by looking at the
labor force participation rate and the percentage change in total hours.
The first two simulations are related to the calculation of the labor supply elasticities
from Section 7.1. A 10% increase in gross hourly wages leads to an increase in total labor
42Orsini (2006) estimated a similar quadratic utility function on the Panel Survey of Belgian Households
for 2001 on the whole subgroup of married women and not specifically on married women with preschool
children and full-time working fathers.
43Van Klaveren and Ghysels (2012) draw the same conclusion for Flemish households. However, they
find small positive labor supply elasticities with respect to the cost of childcare.
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supply of 2.75%, and the labor force participation rate changes from 81.50% up to 83.11%.
Increasing the cost of childcare by 10% only leads to a decrease of 0.56% in labor supply
and to a change of 0.30 percentage points in the labor force participation rate.
The third and fourth simulations are examples of two extreme reforms that are hardly
implementable but are useful for gaining important insight of potential labor supply re-
sponses. The policy debate on childcare reforms often boils down to the discussion of
whether to decrease the cost of care or to increase the availability and accessibility of child-
care facilities. According to Table (10), providing free childcare given the current availability
constraints in childcare supply would lead to an increase of 3.49% in total labor supply.
The maternal labor force participation rate would increase with 1.74 percentage point from
81.50% up to 83.24%.44
The fourth simulation assumes that there are no availability constraints in the formal
subsidized childcare sector. Consequently, the expected childcare costs are lower for almost
all households due to the fact that formal non-subsidized care is more expensive. Addi-
tionally, and most importantly, the elimination of rationing results in the fact that some
households are no longer constrained in their labor supply choice. In the baseline situation,
some households do not have the option of working due to the lack of suitable childcare.
These restricted households have a probability of being offered childcare in general that is
lower than 50%. Due to this counter-factual simulation, these households can now choose
their labor supply from the complete choice set. Total labor supply increases by 6.34% and
the labor force participation rate of Flemish mothers in our sub-sample increases to 87.29%
instead of 81.50%.
Table (11) presents the governmental cost of implementing these two simulations. The
provision of free childcare would cost the Flemish government 7.2 million Euro per month (in
2005 prices).45 By far the biggest cost is the parental contribution, which is now assumed to
be paid by the government. However, this simulation leads to additional employment which
results in extra revenues for the government. Making childcare free leads to an increase
in governmental revenue of 5.2 million per month. Taking these additional revenues into
account, the compensatory effect for the government of this measure is 72.7% of the initial
budgetary cost. If, on the other hand, the government would provide enough suitable
childcare, the compensatory effect is much larger and equals 474.8%. Eliminating the
excess demand for childcare leads to a governmental cost of 1.0 million Euro/month for
subsidizing new childcare places. Due to the large employment effects, the extra revenue
equals 4.8 million Euro/month. The cost per new full-time equivalent worker in the third
simulation equals 2 766 Euro, whereas this cost is negative for the fourth simulation and
44We assume that the supply of childcare is flexible enough to cover this limited increase in demand.
However, we can not completely rule out that this reform also necessitates a slight increase in childcare
capacity.
45It is important to keep in mind that the model is estimated on a sub-sample, i.e. married mothers with
full-time working father and youngest child under 3 years old. Only the budgetary effects of this subgroup
is taken into account in Table (11).
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equals -2 883 Euro/FTE.
Table 10: Simulation results
LFP(%) Change total hours(%)
Baseline 81.50 /
10% higher gross wage 83.11 +2.75
10% higher childcare costs 81.20 -0.56
Free childcare 83.24 +3.49
No rationing in childcare 87.29 +6.34
Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
Table 11: Budgetary cost (Euro/month)
Free childcare No rationing in childcare
Governmental cost: 7 225 157 1 007 571
Subsidizing extra places 502 770 1 007 571
Cost of childcare: 6 722 387 /
Governmental revenue: 5 254 374 4 783 641
Change in SSC employer 1 013 339 1 733 059
Change in SSC employee 544 499 1 002 054
Change in taxes 3 588 141 1 896 093
Change in benefits 108 395 152 435
Net governmental cost 1 970 783 -3 776 070
Compensatory effect 72.7% 474.8%
Cost per new FTE 2 766 -2 883
SSC refers to Social Security Contributions; Source: Own Calculations, FFCS (2005)
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the impact of childcare provisions on employment decisions
of mothers with young children in Flanders. Even though parents state that grandparents
are their preferred care providers, the care contribution of grandparents is decreasing in
Flanders, in line with the trend in most European countries. Moreover, the coverage rate
of subsidized and non-subsidized care in many Flemish municipalities does not suffice to
avail all currently employed mothers. Hence, we conclude that not only is informal formal
childcare characterized by rationing, but that we also have excess demand for non-subsidized
and subsidized formal childcare options.
We integrate this triple rationing in our model in the form of a three-level hierarchy of
rationing. By adopting the partial observability model of Poirier (1980), we estimate the
rationing probabilities in all three childcare sectors and include these estimates in the budget
constraint of each household. Subsequently, we estimate a discrete labor supply model of
the Van Soest (1995) type, while allowing for heterogeneity in prices and distinguishing
between rationed and non-rationed households.
The resulting labor supply elasticities have the expected sign: we find a small negative
effect of childcare costs on both participation and hours-of-work decisions. This indicates
that Flemish mothers with young children are hardly sensitive to price changes of childcare.
The simulations we elaborated in the last section show that rather the availability of formal
childcare slots is the bottleneck for mothers to increase their labor supply: when removing
rationing in the subsidized formal childcare sector, the employment rate among our group
of mothers would increase by 7.63 percentage points.
Both the small impact of prices and the large supply effect are in line with previous
findings for Germany and Italy, countries with a lower employment rate of mothers and less
formal childcare use (below the Barcelona target of the EU) than is the case in Belgium,
which surpassed the Barcelona target of childcare slots for 33% of children younger than
three years, by 2005.Our analyses suggest that even beyond the Barcelona target there
remains scope for expansion.
Moreover, the removal of rationing that we simulate shows some sizeable, positive
budgetary effects for the government: the additional cost of increasing subsidized formal
childcare would, in balance, result in extra government revenue mainly in the form of ad-
ditional social contribution and tax receipts, with the revenue largely exceeding the extra
costs. Even if we want to stress that the outcomes of our simulations should be interpreted
as indications rather than as exact predictions, our results suggest an immediate and large
benefit for the public budget.
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Appendix
Partial observability model
This section is based on Poirier (1980) and Ghysels and Vercammen (2012), and discusses in
detail how partial observability models work, as suggested by Poirier (1980). The first sub-
section explains the model theoretically, and the second gives an overview of the estimation
results of the partial observability model used in this paper.
Methodology
The partial observability methodology allows estimating the demand and supply for all
three types of childcare, even if only the joint outcome Ci (i.e. the current use of childcare
of household i) can be observed. Ci equals 1 if we observe that childcare is taken by
household i, 0 or otherwise. This childcare status, whether a child uses informal or formal
(subsidized and non-subsidized), is the only observable variable, as the effective demand
and supply of childcare slots cannot be observed. The magnitude of rationing in each of
the three childcare sectors (i.e. excess demand) becomes computable when we separately
predict the probability that a child is offered a childcare spot and the probability that there
is a demand for childcare.
The partial observability model can be stated as follows.46 We assume that demand
for any type of childcare by household i can be expressed by the latent variable D∗i which
depends on child and household characteristics Xi,D and a stochastic element i,D:
D∗i = βDXi,D + i,D (13)
where βD is the vector of coefficients. We assume that households effectively demand
childcare, expressed in the variable Di, if D∗i is larger than zero:
Di = 1 if D∗i > 0 . (14)
.Therefore, the probability that parents demand childcare is given by:
Pr[Di = 1] = Pr[i,D > −βDXi,D] . (15)
In line with the modelling of demand of care, we assume that the supply of any type
of childcare to household i can be expressed by the latent variable S∗i which depends on a
vector of child, household and regional characteristics Xi,S and a random term i,S :
S∗i = Xi,SβS + i,S (16)
46The following expressions are written in general terms but hold for all types of childcare.
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where βS reflects the vector of coefficients. Similar to observed demand, we assume that
effective supply of a childcare slot to household i is observed is S∗i is larger than zero:
Si = 1 if S∗i > 0 . (17)
Consequently, the probability of being offered a childcare spot is given by:
Pr[Si = 1] = Pr[i,S > −βSXi,S ] . (18)
In the data we only observe information on whether a household i uses care (Ci = 1)
or does not (Ci = 0). However, this can be expressed as the joint outcome of both latent
variables demand D∗i and supply S∗i . The probability that someone is observed to use
childcare is given by the joint probability that this person demands care and the probability
that they are offered a childcare spot. In line with Poirier (1980), we assume that the
random terms of demand (Equation 13) and supply (Equation 16) are standard normally
distributed and cross-correlated through correlation parameter ρ as in a bivariate probit
model. The probability of observation can be written as follows:
Pr[Ci = 1] = Pr[Si = 1 ∧Di = 1] (19)
Given Equations (13) to (18), the probability that we observe childcare usage can be
written as follows:
Pr[Ci = 1] = Φ(βDXi,D, βSXi,S , ρ) (20)
where Φ denotes the bivariate standard normal distribution and ρ refers to the correlation
between the random terms of the underlying demand and supply functions.
In addition, the probability that no childcare use is observed can also be written as a
joint outcome of demand and supply:
Pr[Ci = 0] = 1− Pr[Ci = 1]
= [1− Φ(βDXi,D, βSXi,S , ρ)] . (21)
Given Equations 20 and 21, the likelihood function L is equal to:
L(βD, βS , ρ) = Σ
n
i=1 Ci ln [Φ(βDXi,D, βSXi,S , ρ)] + (1− Ci) ln [1− Φ(βDXi,D, βSXi,S , ρ)]
(22)
Once the coefficients of the covariates of the likelihood function are estimated, the
probabilities of being offered a spot in each childcare type can be derived. These estimates
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are used in the labor supply model for the estimation of the model and the derivation of
the budget constraints.
Estimation results
In the following tables we provide the results of the intermediary estimation of the demand
and supply of childcare services in total and the three types of childcare services separately
through four partial observability probit procedures. We refer to the text for a discussion of
the identifying variables that are specific to each equation. Table (12) highlights the results
of the bivariate regression of demand for and access to (i.e. supply of) grandparental care.47
Table (14) presents the estimation results for demand and supply in the formal subsidized
childcare sector, and Table (16) shows the estimation results for the non-subsidized childcare
market. The final tables reflect the estimates of the procedure for total childcare service
demand and supply.
47Note that demand and supply are estimated simultaneously but due to limits of space, we provide the
results in two separate tables.
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Table 12: Bivariate regression of grandparental care
Demand for care by grandparents Coef. Std. Err.
Age of the youngest child (in months) -0.322 ** 0.103
Age² 0.008 ** 0.002
Number of children 0.298 0.307
Age of mother -0.023 0.041
Child with special needs (parental assessment)(0/1) 0.154 0.944
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent 2.632 ** 1.235
3. Non-maritally cohabiting -0.011 0.395
Maternal grandmother’s involvement in paid labor
during childhood of mother
2. During part of childhood 0.638 0.572
3. Not at all 0.840 ** 0.405
Mother’s educational level (reference = up to primary
school)
3. Secondary school education -0.891 0.906
4. Higher education -2.139 ** 0.892
Mother’s preference regarding task division with
partner (reference = male breadwinner family)
2. Mother with less time-demanding job than father -0.515 0.564
3. Partners with equally demanding jobs -0.444 0.559
4. Other -0.628 0.635
Mother in fair health (self-assessed)(0/1) -0.189 0.352
Father’s first preference regarding care is
grandparent (0/1)
1.781 ** 0.428
Father’s economic status (reference = father not
present)
1. Full-time job 0.168 0.498
2. Part-time job 0.514 0.623
Constant 4.167 ** 1.877
The following page contains the second part of the estimates
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Table 13: Bivariate regression of grandparental care (continued)
Supply of grandparental care Coef. Std. Err.
Belongs to previous table
Age of the youngest child in months 0.162 ** 0.078
Age² -0.004 ** 0.002
Number of children in the household -0.335 * 0.187
Mother’s age (years) -0.024 0.029
Child with special needs (parental assessment) (0/1) 0.365 0.685
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent -1.261 ** 0.524
3. Non-maritally cohabiting -0.147 0.320
Maternal grandmother’s involvement in paid labor
during childhood of mother (reference = over full
period)
2. During part of childhood -0.570 0.411
3. Not at all -0.975 ** 0.278
Mother’s educational level (reference = up to primary)
3. Secondary school education 0.139 0.338
4. Higher education 1.045 ** 0.412
Type of municipality (reference = residential)
2. Rural community -0.079 0.220
3. Economically concentrated or tourist -0.175 0.230
4. Semi-urban -0.496 ** 0.233
5. Urban -0.399 ** 0.200
Childcare coverage in municipality (FTE/1000 0-2-year
olds)
0.669 0.688
Number of grandparents -0.056 0.075
Grandparental availability index (health. working
status. living distance from family home)
0.242 ** 0.075
Constant -0.714 1.170
N=869. selection: families with child(ren) below 3 of FFCS (2004-2005)
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 chi²(1)=0.514; use correctly predicted: 86%
Significance values * >90%. ** >95%. Log-likelihood = -285.549
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Table 14: Bivariate regression of subsidized formal childcare
Demand for care by subsidized formal care Coef. Std. Err.
Age of the youngest child in months 0.200 ** 0.042
Age² -0.005 ** 0.001
Number of children -0.156 ** 0.068
Age of mother (years) -0.008 0.012
Child with special needs (parental assessment)(0/1) -0.444 0.357
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent 0.418 0.354
3. Non-maritally cohabiting -0.025 0.136
Maternal grandmother’s involvement in paid labor
during childhood of mother (reference = during full
period)
2. During part of childhood -0.482 ** 0.168
3. Not at all -0.472 ** 0.169
Mother’s educational level (reference = up tot primary)
3. Secondary school education 0.282 0.196
4. Higher education 0.858 ** 0.240
Household income is below the poverty line (0/1) 0.043 0.280
Owner of own house (0/1) 0.291 0.181
Taxable value of the house (euros) 0.000 0.000
Mother’s preference of task division with partner
(reference category: male breadwinner family)
2. Mother with less time demanding job than father 0.589 ** 0.188
3. Partners with equally demanding jobs 0.482 ** 0.190
4. Other 0.389 0.251
Mother in reasonable health (self assessed)(0/1) 0.000 0.188
Formal care is father’s first choice (0/1) 1.062 ** 0.107
Predicted supply of grandparental childcare -0.941 ** 0.429
Father’s employment (reference = father not present)
1. Full-time 0.092 0.260
2. Part-time -0.520 0.401
Constant -2.319 ** 0.609
The following page contains the second part of the estimates
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Table 15: Bivariate regression of subsidized formal childcare (continued)
Supply for care by subsidized formal care Coef. Std. Err.
Belongs to previous table
Age of the youngest child in months -0.688 ** 0.219
Age² 0.016 ** 0.005
Number of children 0.575 ** 0.221
Age of mother (years) 0.156 ** 0.042
Child with special needs (parental assessment) (0/1) -0.993 * 0.571
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent 4.181 ** 1.059
3. Non-maritally cohabiting 0.900 ** 0.457
Mother’s educational level (reference = up to primary)
3. Secondary school education 0.337 0.634
4. Higher education 0.053 0.634
Household income is below the poverty line (0/1) -2.670 ** 0.647
Type of municipality (reference = residential)
2. Rural community -0.523 0.382
3. Economically concentrated or tourist -1.388 ** 0.368
4. Semi-urban 1.611 * 0.961
5. Urban 0.838 0.563
Childcare coverage in municipality (FTE/1000 0-2 year
olds)
-1.893 1.303
Proportion of formal care is non-subsidized
center-based care
-3.436 ** 1.182
Proportion of formal care is non-subsidized home-based
care
1.144 1.407
Constant 3.056 2.387
N=870. selection: families with child(ren) below 3 of FFCS (2004-2005)
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 chi²(1)=5.206**; use correctly predicted: 74%
Significance values * >90%. ** >95%. Log-likelihood = -451.885
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Table 16: Bivariate regression of non-subsidized formal childcare
Demand for non-subsidized formal childcare Coeff. Std. Err.
Age of the youngest child in months 0.024 0.052
Age² -0.001 0.001
Number of children -0.237 ** 0.081
Age of mother (years) 0.047 ** 0.016
Child with special needs (parental assessment) (0/1) -0.337 0.431
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent 0.795 0.585
3. Unmarried cohabition -0.094 0.153
Educational level of mother (reference = up to
primary)
3. Secondary school education 0.533 * 0.295
4. Higher education 1.185 ** 0.322
Family income is below the poverty line (0/1) 3.698 ** 1.841
Home owner (0/1) -0.516 ** 0.203
Taxable value of family house (euro) 0.000 ** 0.000
Maternal grandmother’s involvement in paid labor
during childhood of mother (reference = during full
period)
2. During part of childhood 0.113 0.182
3. Not at all -0.035 0.189
Mother’s preference of task division with partner
(reference: male breadwinner family)
2. Mother with less time-demanding job than father 0.263 0.221
3. Partners with equally demanding jobs 0.367 * 0.220
4. Other 0.293 0.277
Father’s first choice of childcare service (reference =
father not present)
1. Formal care 0.180 0.172
2. Informal care -0.524 ** 0.230
3. Other -0.048 0.232
Predicted supply of grandparental childcare -1.335 ** 0.481
Predicted supply of subsidized formal childcare -0.889 ** 0.277
Father’s employment (reference = father not present)
1. Full-time 1.155 ** 0.486
2. Part-time 1.112 ** 0.529
Constant -2.679 ** 0.860
The following page contains the second part of the estimates
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Table 17: Bivariate regression of non-subsidized formal childcare (continued)
Supply of non-subsidized formal childcare Coef. Std. Err.
Belongs to previous table
Mother’s age (years) -0.127 ** 0.039
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single 1.131 ** 0.472
3. Unmarried cohabition 2.406 ** 0.913
Mother is in fair health (self assessed) (0/1) 0.334 0.579
Mother’s educational level (reference = up to primary)
3. Secondary school education 0.535 0.478
4. Higher education 1.368 ** 0.411
Family income is below poverty threshold (0/1) -2.683 ** 0.829
Type of municipality (reference = residential)
2. Rural community 1.378 ** 0.399
3. Economically concentrated or tourist 0.455 0.291
4. Semi-urban -1.436 ** 0.363
5. Urban 0.154 0.244
Childcare coverage in municipality (FTE/1000 0-2 year
olds)
4.760 ** 1.585
Proportion of formal care is non-subsidized childcare
centres
1.184 0.862
Proportion of formal care is non-subsidized
childminders
1.042 0.820
Constant 1.281 1.404
Significance levels: * >90%. **>95%; Use correctly predicted:
83%
Selection: Families with child(ren) below 3 of FFCS 2004-2005;
N = 870. Log likelihood = -347.885 ; Likelihood-ratio test of rho
= 0 chi²(1) = 2.779*
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Table 18: Bivariate regression of childcare
Demand for any type of childcare Coeff Std. Err.
Age of youngest child in months 0.205 ** 0.041
Age² -0.006 ** 0.001
Number of children -0.186 ** 0.068
Age of mother (years) -0.045 ** 0.015
Child with special needs (parental assessment) (0/1) -0.527 0.331
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent 1.241 ** 0.379
3. Non-maritally cohabiting -0.045 0.156
Educational level of mother (reference = up to
primary)
3. Secondary school education 0.755 ** 0.204
4. Higher education 1.290 ** 0.190
Mother’s preference of task division with partner
(reference category: male breadwinner family)
2. Mother with less time-demanding job than father 1.004 ** 0.195
3. Partners with equally demanding jobs 0.936 ** 0.188
4. Other 0.481 ** 0.241
Maternal grandmother’s involvement in paid labor
during childhood of mother (reference = during full
period)
2. During part of childhood -0.194 0.172
3. Not at all 0.033 0.140
Mother’s health (self-reported to be “fair”. 0/1) -0.033 0.164
Household income is below the poverty line (0/1) -0.184 0.343
Family is home owner (0/1) 0.021 0.223
Taxable value of the house (euros) 0.000 ** 0.000
Father’s employment status (reference: father not
present)
1. Working full-time 0.848 ** 0.223
2. Working part-time 0.882 * 0.457
Constant -1.503 ** 0.647
Following page contains second part of estimates
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Table 19: Bivariate regression of childcare (continued)
Supply of any type of childcare Coef. Std. Err.
Belongs to previous table
Age of the youngest child (months) 0.063 0.042
Age of the child squared (months squared) -0.002 ** 0.001
Number of children -0.241 ** 0.079
Mother’s age (years) 0.079 ** 0.019
Child with special needs (parental assessment) (0/1) -0.107 0.349
Marital status (reference = married couple)
2. Single parent 0.461 0.431
3. Unmarried cohabition 0.418 ** 0.191
Maternal grandmother’s involvement in paid labor
during childhood of mother (reference = during full
period)
2. During part of childhood -0.039 0.183
3. Not at all -0.386 ** 0.140
Mother’s educational level (reference = up to primary)
3. Secondary school education -0.268 0.391
4. Higher education 0.292 0.387
Type of municipality (reference = residential)
2. Rural community 0.194 0.170
3. Economically concentrated or tourist -0.121 0.161
4. Semi-urban -0.477 ** 0.172
5. Urban 0.073 0.156
Childcare coverage in municipality (FTE/1000 0-2 year
olds)
2.522 ** 0.771
Household income below the poverty line (0/1) -1.121 ** 0.287
Number of grandparents living 0.243 ** 0.072
Grandparental availability index (health. working
status. living distance from family home)
-0.108 ** 0.046
Constant -2.441 ** 0.916
Significance levels: * >90%. **>95%; Use correctly predicted:
79%
Selection: Families with childr(en) below 3 of FFCS 2004-2005;
N = 870. Log likelihood = -405.554 ; Likelihood-ratio test of rho
= 0 chi²(1) = 24.624**
44
T
ab
le
20
:
E
st
im
at
in
g
ra
ti
on
in
g:
de
sc
ri
pt
iv
es
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
M
ea
n
M
in
M
ax
S
d
O
bs
er
ve
d
us
e
of
in
fo
rm
al
ca
re
(g
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
al
)
.1
7
0
1
O
bs
er
ve
d
us
e
of
su
bs
id
iz
ed
fo
rm
al
ca
re
.3
7
0
1
O
bs
er
ve
d
us
e
of
no
n-
su
bs
id
iz
ed
fo
rm
al
ca
re
.2
0
0
1
A
ge
of
th
e
yo
un
ge
st
ch
ild
(m
on
th
s)
21
7
35
N
um
be
r
of
ch
ild
re
n
yo
un
ge
r
th
an
16
1.
98
1
7
C
hi
ld
ha
s
pa
re
nt
-r
ep
or
te
d
di
ffi
cu
lti
es
(c
om
pa
re
d
w
it
h
ch
ild
re
n
of
si
m
ila
r
ag
e)
.0
2
0
1
A
ge
of
th
e
m
ot
he
r
(y
ea
rs
)
33
.2
5
20
47
M
ot
he
r
is
lo
w
-s
ki
lle
d
(u
p
to
pr
im
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
di
pl
om
a)
.0
8
0
1
M
ot
he
r
is
hi
gh
-s
ki
lle
d
(h
ig
he
r
ed
uc
at
io
n
di
pl
om
a)
.6
3
0
1
M
ot
he
r
pr
ef
er
s
to
ha
ve
a
pa
id
jo
b.
bu
t
of
lo
w
er
in
te
ns
it
y
th
an
pa
rt
ne
r
.3
6
0
1
M
ot
he
r
pr
ef
er
s
a
pa
id
jo
b
of
eq
ua
li
nt
en
si
ty
as
he
r
pa
rt
ne
r
.4
7
0
1
P
ar
en
t
is
si
ng
le
.0
5
0
1
P
ar
en
ts
ar
e
un
m
ar
ri
ed
co
ha
bi
to
rs
.1
9
0
1
P
ar
en
ts
ow
n
th
ei
r
ho
us
e
.6
7
0
1
T
ax
ab
le
va
lu
e
of
th
e
ho
us
e
of
th
e
pa
re
nt
s
(E
ur
o)
60
8
0
16
21
53
4
G
ra
nd
m
ot
he
r
on
m
ot
he
r’
s
si
de
w
or
ke
d
w
he
n
he
r
ch
ild
re
n
w
er
e
yo
un
g
(f
ul
lp
er
io
d)
.5
4
0
1
M
ot
he
r’
s
fir
st
ch
oi
ce
of
ch
ild
ca
re
se
rv
ic
e
re
ga
rd
s
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
.2
2
0
1
M
ot
he
r’
s
fir
st
ch
oi
ce
re
ga
rd
s
fo
rm
al
ch
ild
ca
re
.5
7
0
1
Fa
th
er
’s
fir
st
ch
oi
ce
of
ch
ild
ca
re
se
rv
ic
e
re
ga
rd
s
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
.2
3
0
1
Fa
th
er
’s
fir
st
ch
oi
ce
re
ga
rd
s
fo
rm
al
ch
ild
ca
re
.6
1
0
1
N
um
be
r
of
liv
in
g
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ts
3.
54
0
6
G
ra
nd
pa
re
nt
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
in
de
x
(h
ea
lth
.
w
or
ki
ng
st
at
us
.
di
st
an
ce
)
3.
44
0
8.
66
1.
41
C
ov
er
ag
e
ra
te
of
fo
rm
al
ch
ild
ca
re
in
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
y
(p
er
10
00
ch
ild
re
n
yo
un
ge
r
th
an
3)
.3
4
.1
1
.8
0
P
ro
po
rt
io
n
of
fo
rm
al
ch
ild
ca
re
sl
ot
s
th
at
ar
e
su
bs
id
iz
ed
in
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
y
.7
1
.1
9
1.
00
H
ou
se
ho
ld
in
co
m
e
is
be
lo
w
th
e
po
ve
rt
y
lin
e
(e
qu
iv
al
iz
ed
di
sp
os
ab
le
ye
ar
ly
in
co
m
e)
.0
1
0
1
P
ar
en
ts
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
to
us
e
gr
an
dp
ar
en
ta
lc
ar
e
(l
ik
el
ih
oo
d
to
co
m
bi
ne
po
si
ti
ve
de
m
an
d
an
d
su
pp
ly
)
.1
5
.0
0
.8
0
.1
6
P
ar
en
ts
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
to
us
e
su
bs
id
iz
ed
ch
ild
ca
re
se
rv
ic
e
.3
6
.1
5
.8
8
.2
4
P
ar
en
ts
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
to
us
e
no
n-
su
bs
id
iz
ed
ch
ild
ca
re
se
rv
ic
e
.1
8
.0
6
.9
8
.1
5
So
ur
ce
:
O
w
n
C
al
cu
la
ti
on
s.
F
F
C
S
(2
00
5)
45
Additional tables
• Descriptives of the sub-sample on which the model is estimated:
Table 21: Descriptive statistics sub-sample
Couples
Mother Father
Average working time/week (hours) 27.44 42.01
Average hourly gross wage 16.96 18.86
Participation (%) 80.66 100
Average age 33.25 36.78
University degree (%) 62.70 49.22
Presence of child 0-3 (%) 100
Presence of child 4-6 (%) 37.70
Presence of child 7-9 (%) 15.23
Presence of child 10-12 (%) 9.18
Presence of child 13-15 (%) 4.88
Amount of observations 512
Source: FFCS (2005). own calculations
• Wage regression in order to be able to derive gross labor income at each discrete labor
supply point:
Table 22: Hourly wage regression women
Dependent variable: ln hourly wage Coeff. Std. error
Age .00231 .032160
Age squared .00011 .000486
Civil servant .05576 .037624
Experience .000034* .000796
No degree -.37787* .158335
Primary degree -.60236* .175674
Low secondary degree -.49724* .056266
High secondary degree -.23731* .031096
Constant 2.65311* .519557
*Significant on 5% level
Source: Own Calculations. FFCS (2005)
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